











A NOTE ON GAMES CORRESPONDING TO
SEQUENCING SITUATIONS WITH DUE DATES
By Peter Bonn and Herbert Hamers
May 1998
ISSN 0924-7815A NOTE ON GAMES CORRESPONDING TO
SEQUENCING SITUATIONS WITH DUE DATES
PETER BORM' HERBERT HAMERS'
Abstract
It is shown that sequencing situations in which all jobs have equal processing
times, the due date date of each job is a multiple of its processing time and the cost
of each job is Gnear in its completion time, yield the same class of convex games
as the sequencing situations in in which all jobs have equal processing times, the
ready time of each job is a multiple of its processing time and the cost of each job
is linear in its completion time.
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In a one-machine sequencing situation there is a queue of agents, each with one job,
before a machine. Each job has to be processed on the machine. The finite set of agents
is denoted by N and ~ N ~- n. By a bijection a: N-~ {1,...,n} we can describe
the position of the agents in the queue. Specifically, o(i) - j means that player i is in
position j. The due date d; of the job of agent i is the latest time the processing of this
job has to be completed. The processing time p; of the job of agent i is the time the
machine takes to handle this job. We assume that every agent has a linear cost function
c; :[0, oo) -~ IR defined by c;(t) - a;t with a; 1 0 the cost coefficient of player i. The
completion time C(o, i) of the job of agent i if processed according to a bijection o(in
a semi-active way) is the sum of the earliest time the job can start w.r.t. Q and its
processing time. In this note we concentrate on sequencing situations that satisfy
(A1) d;E{1,...,n}andp;-lforalliEN
Further, it is assumed that there is an initial bijection ou : N--~ {1,...,n} on the jobs of
the players before the processing of the machine starts with the properties
(A2) d; G d~ for all i, j E N with oe(i) G vo(j), and C(oo,i) c d; for all i E N
and - -
(A3) oo(i) - C(oo, i) for all i E N.
Note that the assumptions (A1) -(A2) imply that in the initial bijection there is no
time gap in the job processing and that in particular the last job that is processed
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according to 0o is completed at time n. In spite of the conclusion that assumption (A3)
is superfluous, we have added it here for the sake of convenience and symmetry with
ready time sequencing situations discussed later on. A sequencing situation as described
above is denoted by (N, v~, d, p, a) and will be refered to as a d-sequencing situation.
The total costs co(S) of a coalition S C N w.r.t. a bijection a are given by
eo(s) :- ~~~(G(~, ~)).
iES
The (maximal) cost savings of a coalition S depend on the set of admissible rear-
rangements of this coalition. Since each job has to be completed before its due date, we
will consider only those v: N-~ {1,...,n} that satisfy C(a,i) G d;. Such a bijection
o: N-~ {1, ..., n} will be called admissible for S if it satisfies P(Q, i) - P(vo, i) for
all i E N`S, where P(o,i) -{j E N ~ o(j) G o(i)}. Hence, we consider an order to
be admissible for S if each agent outside S has the same starting time as in the initial
order. iLloreover, the agents of S are not allowed to jump over players outside S. The
set of all admissible rearrangements for a coalition S is denoted by ES . Note that by
the assumptions on the initial and admissible bijections we have for any v E ES that
a(i) - C(o, i) for all i E N.
Given a sequencing situation (N, Qo, d, p, a) the corresponding sequencing game is de-
fined in such a way that the the worth of a coalition S is equal to the maximal cost
savings the coalition can achieve by means of admissible rearrangements. Formally we
have
v(S) - max{~a;G(ao,i)-~~;C(o,i)} (1)
aEEs iES iE5
From the definition of admissible rearrangements it follows that the essential coali-
tions for sequencing games are the connected ones. A coalition S is called connected
with respect to vo if for all i, j E S and k E N, ao(i) G oo(k) G oo(j) implies k E S.
Next, we describe the special class of one-machine sequencing situations, in which all jobs
have equal processing times and the ready time of each job is a multiple of the processing
time and the corresponding class of games. The description of these sequencing games
is identical to the sequencing situations corresponding to due dates. The only difference
is that there is no due date imposed on a player but a ready time. The ready time r; of
the job of agent i is the earliest time that the job can be processed on the machine. We
will concentrate on sequencing situations that satisfy
(B1) r; E{O, ..., n- 1} and p; - 1 for al1 i E N.
The initial order ao has the properties
(B2) r; G r~ for all i, j E N with ao(i) G Qo(j) and C(oo,i) 1 r; ~- 1 for all i E N
and -
(B3) ao(i) - C(vo, i) for all i E N.
Note that the assumptions (B1) -(B3) imply that in the initial bijection vo there are
no time gaps in the job processing and that the job that is processed last is completed
at time n. A sequencing situation as described above is denoted by (N, oo, r, p, a) and
will be refered to as an r-sequencing situation.
In r-sequencing situations we will only consider those bijections o: N~ {1, ..., n} that
satisfy C(a, i) 1 r; f 1 for all i E N. The set of admissible rearrangements, denoted byAs, has the same restrictions with respect to interchanging positions between players of
a coalition .S as before. Hence, we may again conclude that for any o E AS we have that
a(i) - C(a, i). The corresponding sequencing game is defined by
v(S) - max{~ a;C(ao,i) -~ a;C(Q, i)} (2) oEAs ;Es
iES
Hamers, Borm and Tijs (1995J show that sequencing games arising from r-sequencing
situations are convex by establishing relations between optimal orders of subcoalitions.
These relations are obtained by analysing the procedure described in Rinnooy Kan (1976J
that provides an optimal order. For the optimal order in d-sequencing situations we can
use the procedure of Smith (l956J, which operates similar to the procedure of Rinnooy
lían (1976J. Both procedures aim for having the jobs with the largest cost coefficient
a; as far as possible at the front of the queue. The Smith-procedure has to take into
account the due dates, whereas the Rinnooy Kan-procedure has to take into account
the ready times. For this reason the Smith-procedure starts at the end of the queue,
whereas the the Rinnooy Kan-procedure starts at the front of the queue. In spite of this
difference it is possible for d-sequencing situations to establish similar relations between
optimal orders of various subcoalitions as for r-sequencing situations. However, where
in the Rinnooy Kan-procedure these relativns are. est.a.hlished if a player is added at the
end of a(sub)queue, in the Smith-procedure these relations can be established if a player
is added at the front of a(sub)queue. Following exactly the same line of argument it can
be infered that sequencing games arising from d-sequencing situations are convex games.
In fact, we will show even a stronger result: both classes oí sequencing situations
generate the same class of sequencing games.
Theorem 1 Let R(N) and D(N) be the class of sequencing games that arise from r-
sequencing situations and d-sequencing situations, respectively. Then R(N) - D(N).
PROOF: We show that R(N) C D(N). Let (N, v) E R(N). Let (N, oo, r, p, a) be an
r-sequencing situation that generates the game (iti',v). W.l.o.g. we can take ao(i) - i
for a11 i E N. Let S- {i,i -1- 1,...,j}, be a connected set w.r.t. oo. Then
i i
v(S) - max{~akk - ~akzk ~ ak ~ rk ~ 1 t1k E S, {~;,...,si} -{i,..., j}}. (3)
k-i k-i
Consider the d-sequencing situation (N, ro, d, p, Q) in which for all i E N we define
ro(i)-n~1-i,d;-n-r;and~3;-c~(a„-a;)withc-max;E,va;.
We first show that (N, ro, d, p, ~i) satisfies the assumptions (A1) -(A3). Obviously, (A3)
is a consequence of (B1), while (A1) follows immediately from the definition of d and
(B1). If ro(!) G ro(m) then m G 1 which implies that rm G r~. The definition of d yields
immediately that d~ G dm. Further, we have for any 1 E N that o0(1) -!~ r~ ~- 1-
n f 1 - d~. This implies that di 1 n f I - l- ro(l) - C(ro, l). Hence (A2) is satisfied.
Note that írom the definition of ro it follows that S is also connected w.r.t. ro. Then for
the game (N, w) corresponding to (N, ro, d, p, Q) it holds that
i i
w(S) - max{~,dk(n -1- 1 - k) -~Qkyk ~ yk G dk dk E S,
k-i k-i




~ Qk(n f 1- k) -[~ F'kyk
k-i
J 1
- ~(C f an - ak)(n ~ 1- k) - ~(C f an - ak)(n f 1-~k)
k-i k-i
] )




~ ak(k - 2k)
k-i
C v(S),
where the first equality holds since y is optimal, the second equality by the definition of
ro, Q and ï, the third equality and fourth equality by straightforward calculations. The
inequality holds by (3) since ~k - n f 1- yk ~ n-}- 1 - dk - n~ 1 -(n - rk) - rk f 1
and {z;,...,.~i} - {i,..., j}.
Let i be an optimal solution of (3). By defining y by yk - n~ 1 - xk for all k E S we
can show in the same way as above that v(S) c w(S), which completes the first part of
this proof.
Obviously, the second part, D(N) C R(N), can be dealt with in an analogous way. ~
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